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Abstract 
Variable pay links pay and performance but may also help firms to attract more productive 
employees. Our experiment investigates the impact of performance pay on both incentives 
and sorting and analyzes the influence of repeated interactions between firms and 
employees on these effects. We show that (i) the opportunity to switch from a fixed wage to 
variable pay scheme increases the average effort level and its variance, and (ii) high skill 
employees concentrate under the variable pay scheme; (iii) however, in repeated 
interactions, efficiency wages reduce the attraction of performance pay. Social motivation 
and reputation influence both the provision of incentives and their sorting effect. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the last two decades the prevalence of different forms of variable pay has increased 
substantially in many firms and countries.  Variable pay schemes are typically motivated by 
the incentive effect they exert on the employees by linking pay to performance.  It is, 
however, frequently forgotten that performance related pay may also help firms to attract 
the most productive employees and weed out the less productive ones.  In contrast, fixed 
pay schemes not only have less incentive power, but they are also less able to sort 
employees since they are usually implemented when it is difficult and costly to measure 
individual performance.  If this self-sorting effect is not accounted for, the higher efficiency 
observed when comparing a piece-rate compensation scheme relative to an hourly wage 
scheme may be unduly attributed to the incentive effect of the variable wage; see Lazear 
(2005).  The sorting effect arises for two reasons.  Highly productive employees will prefer 
performance pay to hourly or monthly pay in as much as they know that their productivity 
is higher than that of the other employees in the firm.  Thus, performance pay enables them 
to increase their income from work, whereas the less productive employees will tend to quit 
or avoid joining firms that use performance pay schemes because such arrangements are 
not attractive to them.  
A first aim of this paper is to report the results of a laboratory experiment designed to 
investigate the incentive and the sorting effects of performance-pay by studying how the 
employees self-select their incentive scheme and choose their level of effort.  This is 
motivated by the fact that due to dearth of natural data, the distinction between the selection 
and incentive effects of pay schemes cannot be easily documented empirically.  As regards 
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the incentive effect of performance pay, one strand of the literature emphasizes the 
repetitive game nature of employment contracts (see Malcomson 1999 for a survey), labor 
market conditions (MacLeod and Parent 1999), or competition in the product market 
(Bertrand 2004).  Thus far, only a few studies have tried to identify a sorting effect of 
performance pay distinct from its incentive effect.1  The best way to isolate the two effects 
is to use personnel files of firms that have changed their compensation schemes.  This has 
been done in a widely cited econometric case-study of the Safelite Company by Lazear 
(2000 and 2005).  Barro and Beaulieu (2003) study a large hospital company that switched 
from a salary to a profit-sharing plan compensation, and they also find increases in output 
as well as selection effects.  However, following the strategy in Lazear (2000) is, in most 
cases, difficult as the switch from one compensation scheme to another can only rarely be 
considered as exogenous and finding good instruments for the choice of compensation 
scheme is extremely difficult. An additional problem is finding data on individual 
performance under both fixed wage and variable wage schemes.2  Experimental methods 
may help to circumvent some of these difficulties by guaranteeing the exogeneity of the 
introduction of performance-pay.  The relationship between risk attitude and sorting has 
been recently documented by means of field experiments (Bellemare and Shearer 2006) and 
laboratory experiments in which employees can choose between various payment schemes 
(Dohmen and Falk 2006, Cadsby et al. 2007, Eriksson et al. 2008). 
                                                 
1
 Most studies of the consequences of changes in reward systems focus exclusively on incentive effects; see 
Freeman and Kleiner (2005), Paarsch and Shearer (1999), and Nagin et al. (2002).  
2
 Parent (1997) shows, from individual data, that piece-rate pay is associated with an incentive effect whereas 
bonuses are more related to a sorting effect.  A limitation is however that the data do not inform about the 
proportion of the wage that is variable.  Booth and Frank (1999) make use of panel data on individuals to 
control for both observable worker characteristics and unobservable heterogeneity, but no direct measure of 
productivity is available. 
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The laboratory experiment presented in this paper has been designed to test the key 
predictions derived from Lazear's (2000) model in a framework in which effort is 
observable but not contractible and in which the risk attitude of employees cannot play any 
role.  The observability of effort would of course influence the offer of the payment scheme 
by the employers, but here we are interested in the selection made by the employees.  The 
predictions are the following: (i) a switch from a fixed to a variable wage increases the 
average level of effort, (ii) introducing the possibility for the employees to move to a 
variable wage scheme increases the variance in effort, (iii) the gain in productivity is due to 
both an incentive effect and a sorting effect, and (iv) the possibility to choose between a 
fixed wage and a variable pay leads to a segmentation of the labor market with high skill 
employees concentrated in the performance-pay firms and low skill employees populating 
the fixed-pay firms.  Our experimental methodology provides an opportunity to observe the 
incentive and sorting effects when both a fixed wage and a variable reward system are 
available to the employees. It both allows us to control the environment (skill levels, 
structure of pay) and provides unbiased measures of the agents’ productivity and mobility. 
This experiment also accounts for the observation that employment relationships usually 
are long-term relationships.  Repeated interactions frequently involve social motivation that 
could influence both the incentive and the sorting effects of pay schemes.  In repeated 
games where reputation building may occur, the interaction of reciprocally motivated 
subjects and selfish subjects may lead to the enforcement of labor contracts even in the 
absence of a formal incentive system (Falk et al. 1999, Fehr et al. 1997). In such a context, 
the introduction of explicit (positive or negative) incentives may even crowd out voluntary 
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cooperation (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997, Gneezy and Rustichini 2000, Houser et al. 
2008, Dickinson and Villeval 2008).  Therefore, we test the additional hypothesis that (v) 
when interactions are repeated, the difference between the fixed and the variable pay 
schemes in terms of incentive provision and sorting is weakened.  Indeed, a generous (non-
equilibrium) fixed wage might also be able to attract also skilled employees and reciprocity 
might motivate them to work hard. 
 Our experiment involves firms and workers with two possible skill levels who have an 
opportunity to contract and work under different pay schemes.  It consists of two 
treatments, a “fixed wage” treatment and a “menu” treatment.  Two conditions have been 
implemented, a “market” condition and a “partner matching” condition, which are intended 
to represent a spot labor market and a long-term employment relationship respectively. 
Under the market condition, we implement a fixed wage treatment in the first part of the 
sessions. Each firm posts its fixed wage offer.  Each worker then successively chooses an 
offer and decides on her actual level of effort.  In the second part of the sessions, we 
implement the menu treatment in which the firm offers both a fixed pay and a variable pay 
scheme in which the wage increases in the ex post level of effort.  Under the partner 
matching condition, the only difference is that pairs are fixed throughout the session.  
Our findings support the hypotheses mentioned above.  Under the market condition, when a 
variable pay scheme becomes available, the average effort as well as its variance increase 
substantially compared to the situation where a fixed wage is imposed.  The increase arises 
mainly because the high skill employees select the variable pay scheme as they can 
improve their payoff by exerting a higher effort.  As a consequence, the labor market 
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becomes segmented with the low skill employees remaining in fixed pay firms and most 
high skill employees working under a variable pay scheme and putting forth high effort.   In 
the repeated interaction game, however, and relative to the market condition, most firms 
offer higher fixed wages, workers exert a higher average effort under the fixed pay scheme, 
and the high skill employees are less inclined to switch to a variable pay scheme.  Thus, 
repeated interactions affect contractual choices and alter the sorting effect of performance 
pay.  This suggests that efficiency wages may be a reason why firms do not adopt variable 
pay schemes. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 outlines the experimental 
design and procedures.  The empirical results are presented in Section 3.  Section 4 
summarizes and concludes. 
II. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
After a presentation of the experimental protocol, we will derive the theoretical predictions. 
Thereafter, the experimental procedure will be developed.  
Protocol 
The experiment involves firms and employees in equal number.  The employees are either 
low skill type or high skill type with the same probability, and this distribution is common 
knowledge.  These two types of employees differ with respect to their convex cost 
functions: for performing the same level of effort, the low skill employee has to bear a 
higher cost than the high skill employee.  Table 1 displays the cost associated with each 
level of effort by skill.   
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
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 Each session consists of two parts corresponding to two different treatments, the so-called 
Fixed Wage treatment and Menu treatment.  Each part consists of 8 trading periods.  All the 
participants have been subjected to both treatments.  The experiment has been conducted 
under two conditions: a (posted bid) market condition and a partner matching condition.  
Consider first the market condition and the Fixed Wage treatment.  Each period includes 
two stages.  In the first stage, each firm posts an incomplete labor contract on the market.  
The firm chooses both the amount of the fixed wage, w, and a non-binding desired level of 
effort,
 
öe .  In contrast with the standard gift-exchange game, we use here a “mini-game” 
with fewer values of wages and effort.  The wage can take four possible 
values,
 
w ∈ 20,25,35,45( ); the desired effort level is among the values (0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 and 
1).   This design is motivated by the willingness to keep the same values across treatments 
while allowing for diverging utilities of the variable pay scheme according to the 
employees’ skills in the second part (see below).  This would not have been possible with a 
set of wages securing a strictly monotonic wage-effort profile.  Each employee is allowed 
to accept any offer whatever her skill level; thus, in this treatment the firm cannot screen 
the skilled employees by its offer.  All the contractual offers are displayed simultaneously 
on every employee’s screen.  In contrast, a firm cannot see the offers made by the other 
firms since we are not interested in studying wage contagion effects.  As in Fehr et al. 
(1996), a random mechanism determines the order in which each employee can choose 
among the remaining available contracts.  An employee can choose only one contract, and 
she can reject all offers. 
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In the second stage, the employee who has accepted a contract chooses her actual effort 
level from the set of feasible levels.  Effort is observable but not contractible.   The firm 
receives a feedback on the acceptance of its offer by an employee, the skill level of this 
employee and her choice of effort.  Each participant is informed about her payoff in the 
current period.  The payoffs for one period are calculated as follows: 
- for the employee: 
 
pi E = w − c e( )− 8  (with 8 being a fixed cost) upon acceptance of a 
contract, and = 0 otherwise; 
- for the firm: 
 
pi F = (v − w)e upon acceptance of its offer, and = 0 otherwise, where v =100 
denotes a redemption value (i.e. the gross profitability of each unit of effort chosen by the 
employee). This function is standard and guarantees that loss aversion plays no role. 
The launching of a new period reopens the market. Contract offers are identified with new 
numbers so that it is not possible to identify firms or employees later on.  Thus, a firm can 
neither reward nor punish the past decision of a specific employee. This rules out reputation 
formation.  Table 2 displays the net payoffs associated with each possible decision. 
(Insert table 2 about here) 
The second part of the session consists of the Menu treatment.   Now, two pay schemes 
coexist.  In the first stage of each period, the firm posts a menu of contracts to the market.  
The menu includes both an exogenously defined variable pay contract and a fixed pay 
contract.  Unlike in Fehr and Schmidt (2000), where principals choose between an explicit 
contract and an implicit contract, in our experiment the choice between the fixed and the 
variable pay schemes is made by the employees. This design guarantees that the 
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participants will not face a shortage of any type of pay scheme. The variable pay contract 
states that the wage can take four possible values, 
 
w ∈ 20,25,35,45( ), and that the wage 
paid to the employee depends on the actual level of effort chosen by this employee in the 
second stage of the period, according to the following relationship:  
w = Max (20,b(e)-M) 
where the piece-rate b is fixed at 5 and the measurement cost M imposed to the employee is 
fixed at 5.  This means that this wage is determined ex post, after the firm has observed the 
actual level of effort of its employee.  For the sake of comparability of employees’ choices, 
the variable pay scheme is held constant across firms. 3   As i  the first treatment the fixed 
pay contract is an incomplete contract, which specifies both a wage, 
 
w ∈ 20,25,35,45( ), 
and a desired level of effort.  Next, each employee has to choose both one menu of 
contracts among all the remaining offers available in the market and either the fixed or the 
variable pay scheme.   Once a matching has been made in the market, both offers from the 
firm disappear from the market.  This is similar to the adverse selection models: once a 
contract is selected by an agent, the whole menu is no longer available.  Since the variable 
pay scheme is available in every firm, this does not affect the model’s predictions.  
In the second stage of each period, the employee decides on her actual effort level.  The 
firm is informed about the acceptance of its offer, the type of its employee, and her choice 
of both pay scheme and actual effort level.  Each participant is informed about her payoff in 
the current period.  This design allows us to analyze the attraction of each pay scheme on 
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each type of employee and its impact on the effort levels.  Table 3 displays the net payoffs 
associated with each level of effort in the variable pay scheme; the net payoffs in the fixed 
pay scheme are the same as those displayed in Table 2. 
(Insert table 3 about here) 
Half of the sessions have been run with the Fixed Wage treatment implemented in the first 
8 periods and the Menu treatment in the subsequent 8 periods, and half in reversed order.   
Consider now the partner matching condition. In contrast to the market condition, firms and 
employees are here matched at the beginning of the session to form pairs that remain intact 
throughout the session.  The firm is informed from the start about the skill level of its 
employee.  The treatments, the payoff functions, and feedback information are the same as 
in the other condition.  The partner matching condition was implemented in three sessions. 
Theoretical predictions 
Given the assumptions of rationality and selfishness, the predictions of the game are 
straightforward.  In the market condition, in the Fixed Wage treatment, at the second stage, 
any employee should provide e*=emin=0.2 whatever her type and irrespective of the wage 
contracted upon.  No employee has an incentive to choose a higher level of effort since her 
cost increases in the effort level and because she can be neither punished nor rewarded for 
her actual effort.  The firm should, therefore, offer a contract with the minimum wage 
(w*=20 and  ɶe = 0.2 ) in the first stage.  Any employee should accept this offer whatever her 
type since a rejection can provide no better alternative. This prediction would not change if 
                                                                                                                                                     
3Allowing firms to set b would lead to a substantially more complicated protocol without corresponding gains 
of insight since we are chiefly interested in the employees’ choices. 
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the firm were informed in advance about the type of the employee it contracted with. The 
firm’s payoff, given by (v-w)*e, is 16, while the high and low skill employees earn 11 
(wmin-c(emin)-8) and 10, respectively. 
Should the employees opt for a variable pay scheme in the Menu treatment?  Let us 
consider the high skill employee first.  Provided she performs the maximum effort level, 
choosing the variable pay enables her to receive a high wage (45) and to reach her highest 
utility (25).  She is better off than if she had chosen the fixed pay scheme that makes her 
earn 11 in equilibrium in exchange for a wage of 20 and the minimum effort level.  The 
variable pay scheme should thus attract the high skill employees, who are able to increase 
their payoffs by choosing the maximum effort.  In contrast, the low skill employee should 
provide the minimum effort under both schemes as she earns 10 irrespective of which pay 
scheme is chosen and should thus be indifferent between the two.  As a consequence, the 
firm should offer a menu of contracts with both the variable pay scheme and a fixed pay 
scheme with w*=20 and  ɶe = 0.2 . This menu is imperfectly separating since due to the 
minimum wage guarantee, the low skill employee is indifferent between the two schemes.  
The firm is better off in the Menu treatment than in the Fixed Wage treatment because it 
can attract a high skill employee who should opt for the variable pay scheme and choose 
the maximum effort. In the latter case, its payoff amounts to (v-b(e)+M)*e=55.4  
In the partner matching condition, since the game is repeated finitely, predictions regarding 
the decisions of both the firm and the employees are similar.  If all participants have purely 
                                                 
4
 If it recruits a low skill employee, the firm’s payoff is only 16 whatever the mode of payment chosen.  Since 
the firm does not know which type of employee accepts its offer in the market condition, its expected payoff 
is 35.5 in the Menu treatment, compared with the certain payoff of 16 in the Fixed Wage treatment. 
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selfish preferences, we should, when moving from the Fixed Wage treatment to the Menu 
treatment, observe (a) an increase in the average effort, (b) an increase in the variance of 
effort, and (c) a sorting of the employees according to their type, with the high skill 
employees concentrated in the variable pay scheme and the low skill employees in the fixed 
pay scheme due to the offer of a separating menu of contracts.  
However, we know from many experimental studies (Fehr et al. 1996 and 1997) that 
individual behavior may be shaped by social motivation such as fairness, reciprocity and 
inequality aversion.  We now turn to consider what would happen if the firm is fair and 
expects the employees to be reciprocal in the market condition.  In the Fixed Wage 
treatment, such a firm may offer w=45 and ask for 0.6e =ɶ .  If the employee is indeed 
willing to reward the intention of the firm, especially if wage comparisons matter (Clark et 
al. 2006), she chooses an effort equal to the desired one, the firm would earn 33, a high skill 
employee 32, and a low skill employee 25.  All players should be better off with this 
fairness strategy relative to the equilibrium based on selfish assumptions.  This strategy is 
not very risky for the firm since it increases its expected profit more in case the agents are 
reciprocal (it earns 33 instead of 16) than it decreases it if they turn out to be selfish and 
choose the minimum effort (it earns 11 instead of 16). 
In the Menu treatment, a fair and inequality averse firm should offer the same fixed pay 
scheme as in the Fixed Wage treatment, with w=45 and 0.6e =ɶ . This menu of contracts is 
no longer separating.  Its expected payoff is still 33 if the employee is reciprocal and 
inequality averse whatever her skill level.  Indeed, such employee should choose the fixed 
pay scheme that both increases her payoff (25 instead of 10 for a low skill and 32 instead of 
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25 for a high skill) and reduce the difference in payoffs relative to the firm as compared 
with the variable pay scheme.  Therefore, in the presence of social preferences, the 
existence of an alternative performance pay should not affect the choice of the fixed wage 
offer.  This strategy is, however, not only costly to the firm, but also risky.  Indeed, if a 
selfish employee picks this offer, she will opt for the fixed pay scheme and make the 
minimum effort leaving the firm with a payoff of 11.  Had the firm offered a fixed wage of 
20, the high skill employee would have been better off by opting for the variable pay and 
choosing the maximum effort, thus guaranteeing the firm a 55 payoff.   
Consequently, accounting for social motivation, we should, when moving to a Menu 
treatment, observe (a’) a smaller increase in the average effort than under the assumption of 
selfishness, and (b’) less sorting of the employees, more of both types being concentrated in 
the fixed pay scheme.  In the partner matching condition, the same predictions can be made.  
The fair strategy is, however, less risky than in the market condition since the firm can 
punish an employee who behaves selfishly by lowering the wage in the subsequent periods, 
forcing the high skill employee to switch to the variable pay scheme.  
Experimental procedures 
The experiment consisted of 9 sessions, with 16 subjects per session.  We implemented the 
market condition in six sessions and the partner condition in three sessions.  This gives a 
total of 760 and 384 observations, respectively.5  The sessions were conducted at the 
Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), France. The 144 participants were 
                                                 
5
 Among these 760 observations, 384 have been collected in the Fixed Wage treatment and 376 in the Menu 
treatment. Due to a technical breakdown, we lost the 8 observations from one period in the Menu treatment. 
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recruited from undergraduate courses in local Engineering and Business schools.  The 
subjects were inexperienced in this particular type of experiment. The experiment was 
computerized using the REGATE program developed at GATE (Zeiliger 2000).    
 Participants were randomly assigned to a specific computer terminal.  Instructions for he 
first part of the experiment were distributed and read aloud by the experimenter (see 
Appendix, available on the JEBO website).  They were written in neutral language.  
Questions were answered privately by the experimenter, and the participants had to answer 
questions about the computation of firms’ and employees’ payoffs.  No communication was 
allowed.  In each session, 8 participants were allocated the role of a firm, 4 the role of a low 
skill employee, and 4 the role of a high skill employee, and this distribution was public 
information.  Role assignments remained unchanged throughout the session.  After the 
completion of the first part, the instructions for the second part were distributed and read 
aloud.  The participants had to answer a new understanding questionnaire with no questions 
allowed. 
Each session lasted on average 90 minutes, including payment of participants in private in a 
separate room.  All amounts were given in points, with conversion into Euros at a rate of 
100 points = €4.  Payment in cash consisted of the sum of payoffs during each period plus a 
€4 show-up fee.  On average in the market condition, the firms earned €18, the low skill 
employees €14, and the high skill employees €16.  In the partner condition, the respective 
earnings were €19, €15, and €18.  
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IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Overall statistics 
Table 4 summarizes the main results by condition and treatment. 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
With selfish preferences, the model predicts that, after a switch from a fixed pay to a 
variable pay scheme, (i) the average individual effort increases, and (ii) the variance of 
effort increases.  Table 4 shows that the average individual effort is 0.28 under the Fixed 
Wage treatment, and it rises to 0.47 under the Menu treatment (+ 67.86%).  The difference 
is significant (Wilcoxon test, p=0.002).  The non-parametric statistics have been made 
considering that in the partner matching condition, each of the 24 employer-employee pairs 
represents one independent observation, whereas in the market condition, each of the 6 
sessions, with 16 subjects per session, gives one independent observation.  The variance of 
individual effort is 0.03 under the Fixed Wage Treatment, and it rises to 0.12 under the 
Menu Treatment.6 The difference is marginally significant (Wilcoxon test, p=0.088).  
Figure 1 displays the evolution of the average effort over time by treatment and condition 
when the Fixed Wage treatment was implemented before the Menu treatment.  
(Insert figure 1 about here) 
Figure 1 shows that compared to a situation where all the firms pay a fixed wage (i.e., 
periods 1 to 8), the average individual effort is higher when the employees can choose 
                                                 
6
 The difference is also significant when we compare the variances for Fixed Wage (0.02) and Menu 
treatments (0.13) in the market condition (Wilcoxon test: p=0.028).  Corresponding numbers for the partner 
condition are 0.04 and 0.09, but the difference is not significant (p>0.10). 
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between two payment schemes (i.e., periods 9 to 16).  The figure for the sessions in which 
the Menu treatment is played first gives similar conclusions. 
The model also predicts that (iii) the increases in the mean and the variance of effort can be 
related to both an incentive and a sorting effect, and (iv) there is a concentration of high 
skill employees in the variable pay scheme and the low skill employees in the fixed pay 
scheme.  Figure 2 displays the evolution of average individual effort by skill, treatment, and 
conditions for the sessions in which the Fixed Wage treatment was played first. 
(Insert figure 2 about here) 
Table 4 and Figure 2 confirm that decomposing the data by skill levels helps in 
understanding that the incentive property of a variable pay scheme cannot alone explain the 
observed increase in productivity.  We have also run six random-effects Tobit regressions 
accounting for the left and right censoring of the data to examine the determinants of the 
level of effort under each pay scheme, in each treatment and each condition, accounting for 
all the sessions.  The independent variables include the skill level, the rent offered by the 
firm, a time trend, and the order of sessions.  The estimates (available upon request) show 
that skill is a major determinant (at the 1% level) of the subjects’ choice of effort when the 
variable pay scheme is selected, but not when the fixed wage is chosen or implemented.  In 
each condition, the Mann-Whitney tests also show that there is no significant difference in 
the level of effort exerted by the high skill and the low skill employees when they are paid a 
fixed wage, despite the differences in their cost of effort.  However, when the opportunity 
to choose the pay scheme is provided, due to a substantial increase in the productivity of 
the high skill employees, but not of the low skill employees, the difference in productivity 
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by skill level increases dramatically (MW tests: p=0.004 in the market condition, and p= 
0.017 in the partner condition).   
The overall growth in productivity is due to the fact that considerably more high skill 
employees choose the variable pay than the low skill agents when this opportunity is 
available.  In the market condition, only 14.36% of the low skill employees choose the 
variable pay scheme, and they exert on average a low effort under both the variable pay 
scheme (0.29) and the fixed pay scheme (0.23); in contrast, 63.10% of the high skill 
employees choose the variable pay scheme (MW test, 1% significance, p=0.004), and they 
exert either the maximum level of effort when they are paid a variable wage (0.96) or a low 
level of effort when paid a fixed wage (0.27).  These are clear indications of a sorting effect 
of variable pay. 
These observations suggest that the model delivers good predictions.  However, while 
88.21% of effort choices are at the equilibrium in the market condition, 43.47% of the 
decisions are out of the equilibrium in the partner matching condition (significant 
difference, MW test: p=0.070).7  With repeated interactions, the hypothesis is that there is a 
smaller increase in the average individual effort when employees switch from the fixed to 
the variable pay scheme, and there is less sorting of the employees across payment 
schemes.  As predicted, in the market condition, average individual effort increases 
significantly from 0.24 in the Fixed Wage treatment to 0.47 in the Menu treatment 
(Wilcoxon test, p=0.028).  In the partner matching condition, the increase is only from 0.36 
to 0.47 and marginally significant (Wilcoxon test, p=0.057).  In this condition, most high 
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skill employees exert the level of effort that gives them the maximum wage under the 
variable pay scheme (0.92 on average).  However, only 36.67% of them opt for this pay 
scheme whereas 63.10% of the high skill employees make the same choice when 
interactions are not repeated.  In a long-term interaction, there is less segmentation by the 
payment schemes in terms of skills. 
In order to gain further understanding of these differences, we consider next the firms’ 
offers and analyze the self-selection of the employees.   
Self-selection  
However, before studying the self-selection of employees, it is important to know whether 
firms make separating offers.  The prediction is that the firms should always offer 
minimum fixed wages.  Table 4 shows the distribution of fixed wage offers by treatment 
and condition.  In accordance with the experimental literature (Gächter and Fehr 2002), a 
relatively high proportion of the firms offer non-minimum fixed wages, in particular when 
the employment relationship is long-term.  The relative frequency of the minimum wage 
offers increases slightly in the market condition (the partner condition) from 44.53% 
(23.96%) in the Fixed Wage treatment to 48.94% (30.21%) in the Menu treatment.  
However these increases are not significant (Wilcoxon tests, p>0.10).  
Firms pay efficiency wages to elicit a reciprocal effort response from the employee. 
Overall, the correlation of the fixed wage and the desired effort level is positive.  Spearman 
rank correlation coefficients are ρ = 0.49 in the market condition and ρ = 0.40 in the partner 
                                                                                                                                                     
7
 We acknowledge the limitation of this non-parametric test due to the different numbers of independent 
observations when comparing the market and the partner matching conditions (6 and 24, respectively). 
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matching condition, which is significant (p=0.061).  We have also estimated multinomial 
logit regressions with robust standard errors and clustering for individuals for each 
condition (available upon request) and with the minimum wage as the reference.  The 
results show that the impact of the treatment on the probability to offer non-minimum (i.e., 
non-separating) contracts is almost never significant.  In the market condition, wage offers 
of 35 or 45 are positively linked with an increased suggested level of effort and their 
probability decreases over time; their likelihood is not increased by the experience of 
positive reciprocity in the previous period.  The order of the sessions only marginally 
reduces the likelihood of wage offers equal to 35.  In contrast, in the partner matching 
condition, the firm rewards the reciprocity expressed in the previous period by its employee 
by offering fixed wage of 35 or 45 with a higher probability.  In accordance with Fehr and 
Schmidt (2000), firms appear to prefer informal reciprocal interactions (i.e. offering a 
higher fixed wage in the hope of reciprocity) rather than making separating offers. 
To analyze how employees self-select in the Menu treatment, we estimate a random-effects 
probit model in which the dependent variable is the choice of the variable pay scheme 
(according to which the relationship between the effort and the wage level is the same 
across firms). The independent variables are the skill level, the rent offered by the firm, the 
rank of the employee’s decision in the market condition, the order of treatments in the 
market condition, and a time trend.  The results of these estimations are reported in Table 5.  
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
Table 5 shows that the subjects self-select into the different payment schemes in terms of 
skills.  Interestingly, the selection process is attenuated by the generosity of the contractual 
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offer in both conditions, as captured by the rent offered.  In the market condition, 
conditional on the rent offered, there is an additional effect of the decision rank: when an 
employee must choose after the others, she is more likely to opt for the variable pay 
scheme, probably because of a comparison effect.  In this condition the choice of the 
variable pay decreases over time, whereas having an initial experience in the Fixed Wage 
treatment increases the likelihood of a switch to the variable pay in the Menu treatment. 
This confirms the descriptive statistics.  The proportion of employees choosing the variable 
pay scheme is diminishing in the offered rent intervals.  When the offered rent is zero or 
negative, 46.85% of the employees choose this scheme, but when the offer is generous (rent 
exceeds 15), almost 95% of the employees opt for the fixed pay scheme, which allows them 
both to obtain a higher payoff and to share the rent more equally with the firm.  The 
average rent offered is higher in the partner matching condition (14.31) than in the market 
condition (6.85) (MW test: p=0.013).  This may explain why a smaller proportion of high 
skill employees choose the variable pay scheme in the partner condition.  
Efficiency  
If one measures efficiency as joint payoffs, we find that introducing performance pay 
increases overall efficiency by 43.11% in the market condition: as indicated in Table 4, 
average joint payoffs increase significantly from 33.54 in the Fixed Wage treatment to 
48.00 in the Menu treatment (Wilcoxon test, p=0.028).   Is this increase mainly due to the 
incentive effect generated by the introduction of the performance pay scheme or to its 
sorting effect?  We approximate the incentive effect by allocating artificially half of each 
skill category to each payment scheme and by applying to them the actual efficiency of 
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each type of match under each scheme.  Under the admittedly somewhat crude assumption 
that the employees exogenously allocated to each scheme would behave similarly to those 
who have actually chosen these schemes, we obtain an average hypothetical efficiency of 
45.07.  In other words, if half of each skill category were allocated to the fixed pay scheme 
and the other half to the variable pay scheme, the average efficiency of this economy would 
increase by 11.53 points, due to a pure incentive effect.  The actual value, determined also 
by the sorting effect, indicates an average efficiency of 48.00 in the Menu treatment.  
Allowing people to self-select increases the hypothetical value by 3.07 points, which 
represents one-fourth of the incentive effect.  
In the partner matching condition, the increase of the average efficiency after the switch to 
the Menu treatment is also significant, but it is only 15.06%, with average joint payoffs 
increasing from 43.55 to 50.11 (Wilcoxon test, p=0.045).  Applying the same procedure as 
before, we obtain a hypothetical efficiency of 48.94, suggesting that the incentive effect of 
performance pay increases average efficiency by 5.39 points.  Accounting for the sorting 
effect via the actual voluntary distribution of employees across payment schemes increases 
this hypothetical efficiency by an additional 1.17 points, which represents one-fifth of the 
incentive effect. 
These values suggest several comments.   First, switching to an environment that offers 
both fixed wage and performance pay raises efficiency.  Second, even acknowledging the 
limits of their tentative approximation, the incentive effect outweighs the sorting effect.  
Third, in a repeated interactions environment, both the incentive and the sorting effects are 
weakened.  Relative to the market condition, the incentive effect of the switch to the Menu 
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treatment is lower here because firms offer higher fixed wages; therefore, variable pay is 
less attractive to the high skill employees (only 36.67% of the high skill employees choose 
it instead of 63.10% in the market condition).  As a consequence, if the variable pay 
scheme generates by design comparable efficiency in both the market and the partner 
matching conditions (77.88 and 74.64 in a match with a high skill employee, respectively), 
its overall attraction power is weakened in such an environment.   
The analysis of the earnings distribution helps in understanding why the introduction of 
performance pay is not sufficient to maximize joint payoffs fully.  In particular, 
reciprocating to a generous fixed wage by a non-minimum effort instead of choosing the 
variable pay scheme makes the high skill employee better off than exerting the maximum 
effort under the variable pay scheme.  It increases her payoff while allowing for a more 
equal rent sharing with the firm.  In contrast, choosing a variable pay scheme substantially 
increases inequality. 8 An interpretation of these findings is that inequality aversion from 
the firm and from the employee may affect both the incentive and the sorting effects of the 
variable pay scheme and therefore the overall efficiency of the environment. 
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Economic theory of performance pay schemes predicts that the switch from a fixed to a 
variable pay scheme should increase the average output per worker because of incentive 
                                                 
8
 When the fixed pay is chosen in the market (partner) condition, the observed average net payoffs are 15.99 
for a low skill employee, 20.64 for a high skill employee and 17.36 for the firm (21.68, 25.05 and 23.63, 
resp.).  There is no significant difference between these payoffs (Wilcoxon tests, p>0.10).  Under the variable 
pay scheme, the respective average payoffs are 9.52, 24.09 and 47.65 in the market condition and the 
differences are significant (p=0.028 for each pair-wise comparison); they are 10.00, 23.09 and 39.94 in the 
partner condition (significant differences between the low and the high skill employees’ payoffs, p=0.017, and 
between the principal and the low skill employees’ payoffs, p=0.016). 
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effects.  Moreover, if workers differ with respect to ability, the high skill employees should 
be more attracted by the performance pay than the low skill employees since it allows them 
to receive a higher wage by exerting more effort.  
Our experimental evidence confirms the coexistence of the sorting and the incentive effects 
of payment schemes as in Lazear (2000).  It shows that a switch from a homogenous 
environment to an environment in which both a fixed and a variable pay schemes coexist 
entails an increase in both average effort and the variance of effort.  Effort only increases 
for the high skill employees because the variable pay scheme induces them to work harder.  
The low skill employees are not attracted by the variable pay scheme when firms offer non-
minimum fixed wages.  This observation suggests that there is a limit on the adoption of 
performance-pay despite its incentive effect.  This adoption increases team heterogeneity 
within firms, with a widening wage gap that may generate conflicts.  Consequently, 
variable pay schemes are less likely implemented in firms promoting teamwork.  
The comparison between our market and partner conditions shows that the employees who 
choose the variable pay scheme are not necessarily the most ambitious ones.  Provided the 
rent offered is sufficiently high, in a repeated interaction, a non-negligible fraction of the 
high skill employees also opt for the fixed pay.  This indicates that if a firm pays efficiency 
wages to attract reciprocal employees and to allow for less unequal payoffs, then the 
variable pay scheme becomes less attractive to the skilled employees relative to the fixed 
pay scheme.  Thus the social motivation of the subjects influences not only the provision of 
incentives, but may also affect their incentive and sorting effects.  Although our design 
does not leave much room for reciprocity due to the limited space of strategies, we 
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nevertheless observe a smaller ability-based segmentation of employees when firms make 
generous offers and a smaller productivity gap when employees accept these efficiency 
wages and try to build a reputation of reciprocity.   Therefore, we would expect that a 
design allowing for a larger scope for reciprocity would weaken this ability-based 
segmentation even further.  An avenue for further research would be to look for a sorting 
effect based on social preferences and to analyze how social preferences and ability interact 
in the sorting process.  This could contribute to explaining why we observe less 
segmentation of labour markets according to ability than expected by theory.  Our results 
already suggest that we would expect to observe less performance pay in long-term 
employment relationships.  This, in turn, could imply that differences across countries with 
respect to the employment protection legislation may be accompanied by differences in the 
prevalence of performance pay schemes. 
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Table 1. The costs of effort by type of agents 
Effort  0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 
Cost for the low skill employee 2 6 12 20 30 
Cost for the high skill employee 1 3 5 8 12 
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Table 2. Net payoffs in the Fixed Wage treatment  
                           
Actual effort level  
Role 
 
 
Wage      0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 
Low skill employee 10 6 0 - 8 - 18 
High skill employee 11 9 7 4     0 
Firm 
       
20 
16 32 48 64   80 
Low skill employee 15 11 5 - 3 - 13 
High skill employee 16 14 12 9    5 
Firm 
 
25 
15 30 45 60 75 
Low skill employee 25 21 15 7 - 3 
High skill employee 26 24 22 19  15 
Firm 
 
35 
13 26 39 52 65 
Low skill employee 35 31 25 17 7 
High skill employee 36 34 32 29 25 
Firm 
 
45 
11 22 33 44 55 
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Table 3. Net payoffs in the variable pay scheme (Menu treatment)   
 
  
Actual effort level 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 
Associated wage       20 20 25 35 45 
Low skill employee’s payoff 10 6 5 7 7 
High skill employee’s payoff 11 9 12 19 25 
Firm’s payoff 16 32 45 52 55 
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Table 4. Summary statistics 
Condition All data Market condition Partner condition 
Treatment Fixed wage Menu Fixed wage Menu Fixed wage  Menu  
Fixed wage offer 
Relative frequency of 
- offer of 20 
- offer of 25 
- offer of 35 
- offer of 45 
 
Desired effort 
 
28.10 
 
37.67% 
28.12% 
18.58% 
15.62% 
 
0.62 
 
27.71 
 
42.61% 
26.58% 
13.20% 
17.61% 
 
0.67 
 
22.16 
 
44.53% 
29.17% 
18.75% 
 7.55% 
 
0.62 
 
25.66 
 
48.94% 
28.72% 
13.56% 
 8.78% 
 
0.69 
 
31.98 
 
23.96% 
26.04% 
18.28% 
31.77% 
 
0.62 
 
31.72 
 
30.21% 
22.40% 
12.50% 
34.90% 
 
0.61 
 
Nb rejected contracts 
Nb accepted contracts 
21 
555 
16 
552 
4 
384 
1 
375 
17 
192 
15 
177 
% choice variable pay  
             - High skill 
             - Low skill  
 
- 
- 
 
54.51 
15.64 
 
- 
- 
 
63.10 
14.36 
 
- 
- 
 
36.67 
18.39 
 
Mean effort 
           - High skill 
           - Low skill 
Variance of effort 
 
0.28 
0.28 
0.28 
0.03 
 
0.47 
0.67 
0.27 
0.12 
 
0.24 
0.24 
0.24 
0.02 
 
0.47 
0.71 
0.24 
0.13 
 
0.36 
0.37 
0.36 
0.04 
 
0.47 
0.60 
0.34 
0.09 
 
Payoff - High skill 
            - Low skill 
 
Efficiency  
    – High skill match 
    – Low skill match 
 
    18.55 
16.23 
 
36.70 
38.02 
35.37 
 
23.31 
16.48 
 
48.68 
62.20 
35.07 
 
16.98 
14.98 
 
33.54 
34.46 
32.63 
 
22.82 
15.06 
 
48.00 
63.71 
32.38 
 
21.88 
19.01 
 
43.55 
45.57 
41.45 
 
24.33 
19.53 
 
50.11 
59.06 
40.85 
 
Note: Payoffs and efficiency are measured for the accepted offers only. 
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Table 5. The choice of the variable pay scheme 
Dependent variable: Choice of the 
variable pay scheme 
Random-effects probit model 
Conditions Market   Partner 
High skill employee 
 
 
Offered rent 
 
 
Decision rank 
 
 
Time trend 
 
 
Order of sessions (Fixed Wage 
treatment first) 
 
Constant 
        2.448*** 
(0.381) 
 
      - 0.044*** 
(0.013) 
 
0.129** 
(0.053)    
 
  - 0.114*** 
(0.041) 
 
1.055** 
(0.472) 
 
 -1.634*** 
(0.466) 
        1.233*** 
(0.459) 
 
     - 0.113 *** 
(0.022) 
 
_ 
 
 
  0.059 
(0.062) 
 
_ 
 
 
- 0.759 
(0.896) 
Number of observations 
Log Likelihood 
Wald  c2      
Prob >  c2   
375 
-154.702 
56.51 
0.0000 
177 
-62.753 
29.86 
0.0000 
 
Note:  Standard deviations in parentheses.  *** significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 
level. We consider only the observations on accepted contracts from the Menu Treatment. We included 
individual variables (gender, school, experience) in the regressions, but as none of them turned out to be 
significant, they are omitted. 
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Figure 1. Evolution of average individual effort over time by treatment and condition 
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Figure 2. Evolution of average individual effort by skill, treatment and condition 
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